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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
CORTNEY CORWELL, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 960245-CA 
) Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by 
provision of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two misdemeanor counts of receiving stolen 
property in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1993) (R 12-13). She was tried by 
a jury which returned a verdict of guilty on one count and acquitted the defendant of 
the offense charged in the second count (R 78-79). The defendant was sentenced to pay 
a fine in the amount of $150. Payment of the fine was suspended upon condition that 
defendant comply with the terms of a court order entered in an unrelated controlled 
substance conviction (R 85-87, 92-94). Defendant appeals the judgment, sentence, and 
order of probation (R 88). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented by this appeal. Each is accompanied 
by a citation to the record which demonstrates that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court. 
1. Does the evidence support the verdict and judgment of conviction? (R 
211-12). 
2. Did the district court err in refusing to give defendant's proposed 
specific intent instruction? ($220-24). 
3. Does the prosecutor's comment regarding defendant's failing to testify 
require reversal? (No contemporaneous objection). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 is set out in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the fall of 1994, Mr. and Mrs. Elsberry rented their St. George 
condominium to the defendant, Cortney Corwell, and her sister, Cassie (R 151-52; 
Exhibit No. 1). Cassie was 22 at the time and the defendant was 18 (R 160-63, 201-02). 
Corwells apparently moved out of the apartment on December 31,1994 (R 164-65, 218-
19). 
Elsberrys came to St. George on or about January 13 or 14, 1995 (R 154-
56, 163-64). They discovered that the Corwell sisters were no longer residing in the 
condominium (R 154).1 As Elsberrys approached the property Mrs. Elsberry saw four 
There was evidence indicating that Elsberrys had in fact given Corwells notice requiring them to vacate 
the premises by December 31, 1994. See R 216. 
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of their pillows in a Nisson hatchback which was parked a little more than 15 feet from 
the rental unit (R 156, 171). The pillows were in plain view (R 156, 172, 177). 
The automobile belonged to the defendant and was obviously inoperable 
(R 172, 178, 181, 205-206). Apparently, it had not been driven for some time and 
remained in the same location from the time Elsberrys observed it on January 13 or 14 
until at least March 7 (R 183, 189), 
After inspecting the condominium, Elsberrys contacted the St. George City 
police and reported theft of several items of personal property. Elsberrys' complaint 
was assigned to Officer Bill Matthews on January 14, 1995 (R 178). Matthews took 
photographs of the defendant's car on January 20 (R 177) and acquired a warrant to 
search the car on February 1 (R 178). Nothing other than the fpur pillows which were 
clearly visible from outside of the vehicle were recovered in connection with the 
execution of the search warrant (R 10-11). This evidence provided the basis of the 
offense alleged in Count I of the Information. 
When Matthews interviewed the defendant she denied taking Elsberrys' 
property out of the condominium and denied that she had possession of their property 
(R 180). According to Matthews, the defendant indicated that there were "a lot of 
people helping them move" and conceded that one of these individuals may have moved 
or misplaced some items (R 180). 
On March 7, 1995, defendant again met with police officers.2 At that 
time, she mentioned some "silverware and other utensils - other utensils in boxes in her 
car" (R 184). Officer Scott Staley requested permission to re-examine the contents of 
Defendant's sister was not reinterviewed because she had moved to Jackson Hole, Wyoming (R 200). 
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defendant's automobile. Defendant consented (R 185-86). The vehicle was still 
inoperable and parked outside Elsberrys, condominium (R 185,205-06). Staley's search 
produced nothing which belonged to Elsberrys (R 185-86). However, later that day 
during a consent search of a storage unit which the defendant's sister had rented, 
officers found a framed print which they and the defendant assumed had been taken 
from Elsberrys' condominium. It was located in a chest of drawers which belonged to 
the defendant (R 207-08). This print was the subject matter of the offense alleged in 
Count II of the Information. 
When the state rested without presenting evidence of the ownership of the 
print and without presenting evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that 
the defendant intended to deprive Elsberrys of the pillows, defendant moved to dismiss 
both counts (R 211-12). The motion was overruled and both counts were submitted to 
the jury. 
Defendant was acquitted of the theft of the print and convicted of theft 
by receiving the pillows. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts and circumstances of defendant's "possession11 of the subject 
property will not reasonably support an inference that she intended or acted with a 
purpose to deprive the owners of their property. Moreover, the court's instructions did 
not make it clear that this specific intent was an element of the charged offense. 
Finally, defendant was prejudice by the prosecutor's comments on 
defendant's "failure" to testify in her own behalf. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The evidence offered in support of defendant's conviction can be 
summarized as follows: After the defendant and her sister moved out of Elsberrys' 
condominium, four pillows which belonged to Elsberrys and which had been used m 
furnishing the condominium were found in plain view in the hatchback of defendant's 
car. That vehicle was apparently inoperable at all times relevant to this prosecution. 
It was parked in the lot, a little more than 15 feet from the rental unit. There was no 
proof that the defendant placed the pillows in the car, that she ever removed them from 
the condominium complex, that she ever handled or used them, or that she attempted 
to conceal them. 
The elements of the alleged offense, in the context of the facts presented 
in this case, include: (1) that defendant obtained possession of property of another; (2) 
that defendant knew the property had been stolen or believed that it probably had been 
stolen; and (3) that defendant acted purposely to withhold the property permanently or 
for so extended a period that a substantial portion of use and benefit thereof would be 
lost. See State v. Murphv. 617 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1980). Cf. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
401(3)(a). 
Murphy is instructive on several levels. In that case as in the instant case, 
the subject property was not damaged or disposed of under circumstances that would 
make it unlikely that the owners would recover it. Murphy, the defendant drove the 
subject motor vehicle for one evening and left it parked "in plain view" at 400 North 800 
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West, in Cedar City, Utah. The owners' address was shown on the registration and 
certificate of title as "800 West 400 North 1156," which was apparently a space in a trailer 
park located at that intersection. Id. at 401. 
Justice Maughan's lead opinion focused on the specific intent element of 
the offense of theft by receiving. 
The state's representation that the elements of the crime are 
merely two-fold, i.e., (1) receiving or disposing of the property, and 
(2) knowledge the property was stolen, evidences a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the statue and the very essence of the 
culpable activity. This general misunderstanding of the nature and 
scope of the crime must be remedied by this Court. 
Implicit in the language of the statute are the basic elements of the 
crime: (1) property belonging to another has been stolen; (2) the 
defendant received, retained or disposed of the stolen property; (3) 
at the time of receiving, retaining or disposing of the property the 
defendant knew or believed the property was stolen; and (4) the 
defendant acted purposely to deprive the owner of the possession 
of the property. Before the defendant can be convicted of the 
crime of receiving stolen property the prosecution must present a 
quantum of evidence sufficient to establish each element of the 
crime. 
Id. at 401-402 (footnotes omitted). 
In concluding that the state had failed to make a prima facie case, Justice 
Maughan noted that because proof of Murphy's intent was based exclusively on 
circumstance, "facts relating to the ownership, location and condition of the van become 
important." Id. at 403, n. 11. Applying the law to those facts, Justice Maughan wrote: 
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to introduce any 
evidence either circumstantial or direct to establish and prove an 
unlawful purpose at the time of the defendant's possession of the 
vehicle. Under the evidence presented at trial, the defendant 
drove the vehicle for one evening and then parked it at the 
address of the registered owners. He did nothing to alter its 
appearance, impair its future usefulness to the owners or reduce 
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its subsequent economic value. The defendant requested no 
reward or other compensation for its return and did not dispose of 
it under circumstances that would make it unlikely the owners 
would recover it. 
Id. at 402-03 (footnotes omitted). 
The supreme court concluded that the evidence would not support a 
finding that Murphy acted purposely to deprive the owners of their property and 
therefore "the very essence of the culpable activity" underlying the commission of the 
charged offense had not been established. 
In the case before the court, the subject property apparently never left the 
condominium complex. It remained in the parking lot, a little more than 15 feet from 
the rental unit, in plain view of any person approaching Elsberrys' condominium. 
Indeed, Elsberrys observed the pillows in the hatchback of defendant's inoperable car 
the first time they returned to the condominium after Corwells had vacated the 
premises. The observations which the supreme court made concerning the vehicle which 
was the subject matter of the Murphy prosecution apply as well to the property which 
is the subject matter of the instant case. Moreover, unlike Murphy who made some use 
of the subject property, there is no evidence that the defendant here placed the pillows 
in the car, made any use of them, and in any way "acted purposely" to deprive the 
owners of their property. 
Instead of presenting any evidence of defendant's intent to deprive, the 
state resisted instructions which would have clearly informed the jury of the specific 
intent element of the subject offense and argued that because the defendant "took 
responsibility for the safekeeping of [Elsberrys'] property" (R 226), she was guilty 
whether or not she took the pillows and put them in the car (R 235), and "whether she 
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really wanted the pillows or not" (R 234). The crime was complete in her possession 
of another person's property. More specifically, she was worthy of punishment because 
ft[s]he didn't feel that her actions were anywhere wrong, even though she had possession 
of somebody else's property" (R 234). 
[BY THE STATES PROSECUTOR]: [Defendant had] every 
opportunity to look through the belongings that she had control of 
in her car, in her storage unit, and in finding that she had property 
belonging to the Elsberrys, bring it back. 
R227. 
An intent to deprive Elsberrys of their pillows cannot be reasonably 
inferred from nothing more than the defendant's failure to take the initiative to take the 
pillows from the car back into the condominium. The judgment must be reversed and 
the case dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED SPECIFIC INTENT 
INSTRUCTION. 
Defendant proposed a specific intent instruction (R 80-81, 220-21) which 
was based on the patterned specific intent instruction promulgated by the Federal Bar 
Association, Utah Chapter. The state objected to the instruction (R 222-23) and the 
court refused to give it (R 220-24). 
The absence of a specific intent instruction facilitated the argument 
advanced by the state's prosecutor in closing. 
[BY THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR]: Ms. Corwell moved into 
Mr. and Mrs. Elsberry's home, knowing that the property in the 
home did not belong to her, it belonged to Mr. and Mrs. Elsberry. 
She, along with her sister, took responsibility for the safekeeping 
of that property with a full understanding that when they left the 
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property — when they left the home, the property that did not 
belong to her would remain there. That did not happen. You 
may be asked to think that this is a childish irresponsibility, it is 
not. The Elsberry's were invaded. 
Officer Matthews . . . gave Miss Corwell every opportunity to look 
through the belongings that she had control of in her car, in her 
storage unit, and in finding that she had property belonging to the 
Elsberrys, bring it back. 
To knowingly and intentionally deprive a person of what is 
rightfully there's [sic], no matter how matter how large or no 
matter how small. No big deal? 
I repeat, this is not a case of childish irresponsibility, Ms. Corwell 
knowingly and intentionally deprived Elsberrys of their property. 
Now, whether she really wanted the pillows or not doesn't matter. 
She didn't give them back, because she didn't feel guilty. She 
didn't feel guilty. She didn't feel that her actions were anywhere 
wrong, even though she had possession of somebody else's 
property. Property that was only recovered by the police, not 
because she brought them back. 
Her taking of the items and putting them in her car is not a 
necessary element of this crime. What she did requires a finding 
of guilt, whether she put them in there, or her sister put them in 
there. She knew from the beginning that she had some stuff; her 
sister had some stuff. 
R 226-28, 234-35. 
The law-trained may well view the foregoing as a clear reference to the 
element of specific intent and the prosecutor's contention that the state had carried its 
burden of proving that the defendant acted purposely to deprive Elsberrys of their 
property. However, the argument suggests that having undertaken the "responsibility 
for the safekeeping of [Elsberrys'] property," the defendant was guilty when she failed 
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to take affirmative action to restore the property regardless of her intent in acting or in 
failing to act. 
While a jury box full of lawyers may have been able to glean the specific 
intent element of the offense from the instructions which were given, the layman who 
has no background in the principles of the criminal law and the common law distinction 
between larceny and trespass to chattels may have easily been lead to believe that, if the 
defendant failed to act promptly to restore the pillows to Elsberrys once she knew they 
had been placed in her car, the specific intent would be made out. 
In State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the defendant's conviction because the jury instructions "failed to explain 
adequately the distinction between general and specific intent requirements or relate 
those requirements to the facts of the case " Id. at 78. In concurring in the reversal 
of the conviction, Justice Stewart wrote: 
Although the instructions used the term "specific intent,1' they did 
not define that term. However meaningful that term of art may be 
to lawyers, it clearly fails to convey the intended legal meaning to 
jurors unless it is carefully and precisely defined. Absent such a 
definition, the jury could not possibly find all of the necessary 
elements of the crime, especially in view of the defense relied upon 
in this case. 
Id. at 81. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the instructions given in the instant 
case did not acquaint the jury with the concept of specific intent. Where an offense by 
its very definition requires specific intent, that intent is as much an element of the 
offense as the act itself. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE PROSECUTOR'S 
MISCONDUCT. 
After defense counsel closed, the state's prosecutor made the following 
argument in rebuttal: 
[BY THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Pendleton and I could 
stand up here and compare war stories about our respective years 
and about what we do. I, too, was a defense attorney for many 
years, and while in this position now as a prosecutor, I'm not 
allowed to comment on whether or not a defendant chooses to 
take the stand, what I can tell you is that there are many reasons 
why a defense attorney might advise his client to either testify or 
not testify. 
R 233-34. 
The prosecutor not only commented on defendant's silence but invited the 
jurors to speculate about the "many reasons why a defense attorney might advise his 
client... not to testify" (R 234). This was error. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 
(1965). 
When such a comment is made before the jury, the potential for prejudice 
is manifest. The error requires reversal of the resulting judgment of conviction unless 
it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless. See State v. Eaton, 
569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977). Only when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming can such 
an error be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not such a case. 
Defendant's failure to draw the district court's and the jury's attention to 
the improper comment by making a contemporaneous object does not preclude 
appellate review. A criminal defendant does not waive the right to appellate review by 
his failure to make contemporaneous objection to the state's improper comment where 
the prosecutor's misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. See Harris v. State. 
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645 P.2d 1036, (Okla.Crim.1982). Typically, improper comment challenges arise in the 
context of statements which arguably allude to the defendant's silence but do not directly 
comment thereon. The error, if indeed there is any, cannot ordinarily be characterized 
as "plain" or "fundamental" where the comment does not clearly direct one attention to 
the defendant's silence. Error is fundamental when the prosecutor's comment makes 
a direct reference to the defendant's failure to testify. See id., at 1038; State v. Baca. 
89 N.M. 204, 549 P.2d 282 (1976)(prosecutor's direct reference to defendant's silence 
is reviewable as "plain error"). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that defendant's of 
conviction must be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this tj_ day of July, 1996. 
Jsd 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this (1 day of July, 1996, I did personally 
deliver two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing document to Marlynn 
B. Lema, Deputy Washington County Attorney at 178 North 200 East, St. George, Utah. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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ADDENDUM 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the 
case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a 
separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or 
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence 
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the 
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then 
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, 
received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as 
defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on 
the security of the property; 
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
